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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a statistical model for identifying which con-
texts favour the growth of populism in European democracies by
analysing the relationship between the Human Development
Index (HDI) and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). With the
aid of United Nations (UN), Transparency International
Organization and Institute for Global Change data for the years
2013-2017, and after applying statistical convergence, our study
identifies different clusters of European democracies where popu-
lism has grown after serious episodes of social conflict in the
wake of one of the most important financial and economic crises
in recent history. The study’s findings provide new insights which
help to identify weaknesses in democracies where populist parties
could grow.
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1. Introduction
One of the strengths of the European Union is its dimension: 550 million people in
28 member-states covering over 4 million square kilometres and sharing monetary,
economic and political synergies. One of its weakness is the consequence of the dom-
ino effect: the impacts and threats to one of the EU’s members are to the loss of all
as the recent international crisis demonstrates.
The leaders of the Harvard University-European Parliament Project, Mark Esposito
and Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, defined the crisis as “the subsequent massive build-up of
debt” (2014, p. 3). In 2013, “the total debt represented a percentage of annual eco-
nomic output had risen above 300% for France, Italy, and Spain and above 250%
for Greece. Even in fiscally conservative Germany, total debt as a percentage of
annual economic output was approximately 240%”. A major crisis hit Europe and
governments had to face different social conflicts as a consequence of despair
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(unemployment) and mistrust (political corruption). This environment of social con-
flicts is one of the most congenial to the rise of populism (understood as extremist
ideologies from left to right).
This paper was motivated by an interest in the rise of populism in European
democracies as a result of their very weaknesses. Our first step was to establish a
frame for the pre- and post-crisis (2013–2017) periods using tried and tested inter-
national indicators like the Human Development Index and the Corruption
Perception Index.
The Human Development Index (HDI) includes variables such as a country’s life
expectancy and health, knowledge, decent standard of living, environmental sustain-
ability, human security and rights and gender equality (Human Development Report
Office, 2015). The Corruption Perception Index (PCI) captures perceptions of the
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both small- and
large-scale corruption, as well as the “hijacking” of the state by elites and pri-
vate interests.
Exploring the relationship between both indicators was the second step in our
research. We identified risk scenarios during the crisis where social conflict could
trigger political populism in European democracies.
Dittrich (2017) has explained how “in the case of Germany, a particularly strong
rise in interaction with “AfD” is connected to the refugee crisis of 2015. The Italian
anti-establishment Five-Star Movement saw large gains linked to their mobilization
against the Italian constitutional referendum in December 2016.”
The data examined by Dittrich (2017) measured growth in Facebook fan numbers
and interaction rates among populist parties and movements in France, Germany,
Italy and Spain between 2015 and March 2017.
Dittrich (2017) and Casero-Ripolles, (2017) have identified the development of
social networks as the key factor in the emergence of populist parties after a
social conflict.
Virality and the speed at which social networks transmit the political messages of
populist parties have been identified as an important factor in their growth. As
Dittrich (2017) puts it, “in the case of France, Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc
Melencthon have been dominating social networks for the last two years and are rely-
ing on them heavily in the 2017 presidential campaign. In Spain, on the other hand,
the mobilization of Podemos on social networks seems to have reached its peak and
is now in steady decline” (Dittrich, 2017, p. 1).
The previous literature points out that populist governments actively reduce eco-
nomic freedom and legal security, and tighten economic regulation (Rode & Revuelta,
2015), while their growth is triggered by social conflicts which can be observed
through unemployment and debt ratio indicators, the first alarm signals of falling
competitiveness.
After taking the raw data of the European Regional Competitiveness Index for the
years 2013-2017 and applying statistical convergence, our study identified different
clusters of European democracies where populism grew after serious episodes of
social conflict in the wake of one of the severest financial and economic crises in
recent history (Esposito, et al., 2014).
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The paper proceeds as follows: we begin by discussing earlier work on different
definitions of human development and its relationship to corruption and populism;
we then set out the data and the method used for estimation; next, we present and
discuss our results; and finally, we draw some conclusions and explain the limitations
of our research.
2. Literature review
At time of writing, there is no generally accepted definition of populism. Aslanidis
(2016) has identified as one of the most cited definitions Cas Mudde’s of fifteen years
ago (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Mudde argued that populism is ‘an ideology that consid-
ers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,
“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be
an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people’.
Rode and Revuelta (2015) have explored different definitions –of an economic,
structural, political-institutional or discursive nature—in the literature on populism,
one of the most conclusive of which was put forward by Edwards (2010), who recog-
nized that populism is not the monopoly of the left but exists on the right as well.
That means that extremist ideologies appear in democracies which have been weak-
ened as a result of economic crisis–unemployment, uncontrolled immigration or any
other social conflict.
Disciplines such as political science, human development, marketing and commu-
nication, economics and big data (which studies the impact of social networks around
the world) have found in populism a fruitful field for research. Aslanidis (2016) has
proposed the building of an interdisciplinary analytical framework to stimulate quan-
titative work. This approach is interesting in its identification of populism as a com-
plex phenomenon requiring interdisciplinary study. The impact of populism is clear,
but the means by which it expands or is restricted in democracies, especially
European ones, have yet to be explored.
Recent research has shown that phenomena like social networks are a means of
expanding populism, which can grow in societies where the presence of social net-
works is significant (Dittrich, 2017, Casero-Ripolles, 2017).
In a similar direction, other studies have examined the media’s impact on support
for the agents of populism. These studies have generally found a link (in some coun-
tries) between the prominence of anti-immigration issues in the news and support for
anti-immigration parties, even when controlling for other factors (Boomgaarden &
Vliegenthart, 2007, 2009; Gerstle, 2003).
That said, the growth of populism in Europe is a key fact in democracies in the
early decades of this century. The recent major financial crisis in Europe (2013–2017)
propitiated an environment which strengthened emotions like despair in the face of
unemployment and mistrust due to political corruption, one of the main weapons
populisms (extremist ideology) wields in its campaigns against traditional parties.
This paper studies the European environment before and after the crisis with the aid
of two variables which are acknowledged and measurable in all of them: Human
Development and Corruption.
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2.1. Why were these variables selected?
Human development encompasses health, nutrition and basic education as ends in
themselves and as a means to achieving that development (Anand & Sen, 1994).
The Human Development Index is the starting point for any attempt to under-
stand how a country responds to different economic and social challenges. In this
connection, Ul Haq (1995) provides an interesting review of the concept and
introduced other variables in the index with a view to tightening the fit between
concept and reality. One such variable was corruption, which can help to explain
radical changes in a democracy, even when there are high values for the Human
Development Index.
For that reason, this paper studies the relationship between human development
and corruption as providing the framework within which populism might grow in
cases of social conflict.
3. Model and methodology
This paper proposes a model for analysing the relationship between human develop-
ment and corruption in Europe (EU-28) during the economic, social and financial
crisis of 2013-2017. The impact of this crisis on the EU citizens was to erode their
optimism and hope in the wake of various social conflicts which emerged on account
of such variables as unemployment, immigration and political corruption and led to
increased lack of confidence in their democracies (see Figure 1).
Our model is based on our two hypotheses:
H1: A higher HDI value correlates to lower levels of corruption in a region.
H2: There is a direct relationship between vote swings in favour of populist parties and
an increased value for a country’s CPI. There is an indirect relationship between vote
swings in favour of populist parties and an increased value for a country’s HDI.
Figure 1. The proposed model (author’s design).
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We obtained the variables from the United Nations (UN) Human Development
Index (HDI), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en. This index includes information on
three basic dimensions that measure a region’s level of development: life expectancy
at birth (health), expected years of schooling (education) and gross national income
per capita (wealth). We have used the composite index to make comparisons over
time since the methodological criteria for measuring these variables tend to change
every year. In addition, in a ranking of the different countries analysed we provide
information which complements the index’s values.
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is published by the Transparency
International Organization (https://www.transparency.org/). The scale of the index is
from zero points (highest level of corruption) to one hundred points (lowest level of
corruption) in the public sector. According to its publishers, the index is based on
the opinion of a panel of experts and executives and covers different types of admin-
istrative and political corruption like bribes, embezzlement of public funds, etc. Since
the method for collecting data changed after 2012, the data sequence available corre-
sponds to the period 2013–2017.
We also used the populism database of the University of Melbourne (reproduced
by the Institute for Global Change – https://institute.global/) to obtain information
about election results and the percentages achieved by populist parties (of the extreme
right and left). This database classifies political parties as populist as a function of
their opposition to the current political system or to financial institutions and their
heavy dependence on one leader. The database further presents the evolution of the
percentage of votes won by populist parties in the period 2008–2018. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we consider a country to have a high degree of populism in two
circumstances: (a) when populist party votes exceed 25% of the total number of votes,
thereby implying considerable capacity to influence governments, or when populist
parties have grown more than 25% in the analysed period.
Finally, we used variables associated with the unemployment rate (for example, the
ratio of total unemployment with respect to the active population) as well as the per-
centage of immigrants over the total population obtained from the Eurostat database
(https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/). For our purposes, the concept of immigrant refers to
people who have lived in a country for at least twelve months but were born in another.
In short, the variables are as follows: CPI (Corruption Perception Index), HDI
(Human Development Index), Vot (percentage of votes of parties considered popu-
list), Unem (unemployment population), Imm (percentage of immigrants with respect
to the total population). The abbreviation “Var” stands for the measure of the vari-
ation rate (see Table 1). A convergence analysis was performed for the different coun-
tries with respect to CPI and HDI in order to derive a variable which relativized the







In view of our methodology, we present a descriptive analysis based on the evolu-
tion of the different variables and focusing on the relationship between the CPI and
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the HDI of the 28 EU countries. In this connection, we used a matrix of regional
convergence with respect to the evolution of the two main variables in relative aver-
age terms for the 2013–2017 period.
The behaviour of the different variables—more than proportional growth of
decrease with respect to the other countries—allowed us to determine whether there
had been real convergence or divergence among the European countries. To be more
precise, the matrix analysed four types of regions: those that diverge negatively in
both variables, those that diverge positively, those that converge positively in both
variables and those that converge negatively. This technique is common in regional
economic studies (Quah, 1996; Barro & Sala-i-Martın; 1992; Daveri, 2002).
We also devised a regression model to determine the effects of these variables on
the increase of populism in European regions. The dependent variable is the variation
in the percentage of votes obtained by the populist parties, while the independent
variables are variation in CPI, HDI, unemployment rate and percentage of immigra-
tion. The data studied all belongs to the period 2013–2017 except for election results,
which start in 2008 in order to include the birth of populist parties in Europe.
Countries were classified according to the variation in populism over time.
The first model presented analysed variation in votes as a function of the rest of
the variables, thereby avoiding any collinearity. However, the HDI variable was
excluded when analysing the voting process of 2007 in order to avoid possible colli-
nearities.
DVot0817 ¼ aþ b1  DCPI1317 þ b2  DHDI1317 þ b3  DDes1317 þ b4  DInm1317
þ l1317
Vot2017 ¼ aþ b1  CPI2017 þ b2  Unem2017 þ b4  Imm2017 þ l2017
4. Discussion and results
With the aid of descriptive linear regression, we obtained EU-28 data for 2013-2017
and the variation rate. The only exception, due to the available data, was the populist
vote percentage and the immigration percentage variables, which were considered for
the year 2010 and 2017, respectively.
Although there was disparate behaviour across the countries, on average CPI
improved everywhere except Hungary and Cyprus, whose positions in the ranking
fell. The reverse was true of Czech Republic and Romania where, despite starting
from low positions in the ranking, perception of public institution management
improved considerably. As for HDI, there was barely any improvement in the period
considered, with an average growth of just over one percentage point. The sole excep-
tion was Denmark, the only country where HDI fell. The greatest variations were to
be observed in the variable indicating the percentage of votes won by populist parties
in their respective legislative elections.
Table 1 shows the values of the variables for the studied period and their variation
over the time. It also indicates the average value and the standard deviation for the
sample of countries.
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The average trend indicates that in just ten years the electorate achieved by these par-
ties doubled, especially in countries such as Spain, Italy, Croatia and Romania. As for
the percentage of unemployed population, it fell in all EU countries, while the percent-
age of the immigrant population increased considerably. Both variables could explain
the emergence and expansion of populist parties, due initially to the policies for restruc-
turing labour implemented during the crisis and later to immigration policies.
If we analyse the model, a direct relationship can be observed between the HDI
and the level of corruption (Figure 2). This becomes more solid and closer over
time in line with the high results for R squared. In this connection, the position
of the country in the ranking improves with respect to higher HDI.
However, it is interesting to observe the behaviour and evolution of both variables
for different countries. Our analysis considered the relative position of each region
compared with the average for the group of countries. Thus, for the year 2013, in the
set of European countries considered average HDI was 0.87 and the average position
in the CPI ranking was 63.29. These values changed to 0.88 and 64.64 respectively at
year-end 2017. These positions determine the relative positioning of the countries.
At the same time, there was high correlation between the indices since for both peri-
ods those countries with a higher than average HDI corresponded to those with an
above average position in the CPI. The only exceptions were Slovenia, Italy and Spain
with above average HDI but below average CPI. If we analyse the evolution of these
two variables over time, four categories of countries can be observed (see Figure 3):
a. Countries with a positive, above EU-average variation rate in HDI and CPI:
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania. It is noteworthy
that all these countries, except Ireland, were able to reduce the perception of cor-
ruption in their regions. The case of Greece was significant because it rose more
than eight positions in the ranking in the period analysed. This improvement in
perception was accompanied by an increase in its HDI which was more than
proportional to the EU average. Notwithstanding these improvements, these
countries started from positions below the EU average and continued to maintain
lower relative positions at the end of the period.
b. Countries with lower HDI growth in comparison with the group of EU coun-
tries but with an improvement in CPI which was more than proportional to
the rest of EU countries: Luxembourg, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy,
Estonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The first three countries diverged
Figure 2. Relationship between HDI CPI (source: the author).
2950 M. SARABIA ET AL.
completely from other countries to achieve better CPI positions despite slower
HDI growth, which was justifiable considering their high HDI values. The
other countries were still in lower positions than the European average, des-
pite obtaining better positions in the ranking during the 2013-17 period.
c. Countries whose HDI improved but whose CPI worsened with respect to the EU
average: Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Spain and Sweden. In these countries, the
increase in their citizens’ CPI is remarkable considering their above EU-average
growth in HDI. The causes producing this phenomenon might have to be looked
for beyond the variables that compose the HDI.
d. Countries with lower HDI and CPI growth with respect to other countries:
Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Netherlands and Portugal.
The position of these countries in the CPI ranking fell and in the HDI increased
at a much lower rate than the other EU countries. However, except for Portugal
and Hungary, these countries started from relative above EU-average positions.
This negative convergence indicates that these countries had already reached rea-
sonable positions on emergence from the crisis, which would have to be consoli-
dated over time.
As far as our second hypothesis is concerned, we verified it as being a derivation
of the first by incorporating the variable relating to the consolidation of populist par-
ties within EU economies. To be more precise, the hypothesis sought to establish
Figure 3. Relationship between HDI CPI (source: the author).
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whether the percentage of votes obtained by the populist parties in the different gov-
ernment elections of 2017 could be explained in terms of CPI, HDI, unemployment
rates and immigration levels in the existing regions at year-end 2017 (Table 1). That
said, as a high correlation between HDI and CPI was observed in the previous ana-
lysis, and after studying the correlation matrix, it was necessary to eliminate one of
the indexes to explain the percentage of votes in 2017.
Linear regression using a backwards estimation indicated that the only statistically
significant and negative variable was the CPI. Falling positions in the corruption
ranking correlated with higher percentages of votes obtained by populist parties (see
Table 2). However, the other variables were not considered statistically significant.
As for the unemployment rate, the first model shows a non-significant positive
relationship, while its relationship with the immigration rate is non-significant and
negative. These last two variables, which are very important for the measurement of
social conflict, suggest that the fear of unemployment and rising immigration could
be important in the early, formative years of these parties, above all if those coincide
with the middle of an economic recession, but that they are not decisive nowadays.
However, during the stage of progressive economic recovery, when the labour market
is more dynamic and there is controlled, legal immigration, the factors explaining the
rise of populist parties are to be found elsewhere. Many may be local factors (as in
the case of Spain) or the result of economic pressure imposed by the EU in order to
fulfil its criteria for continued membership (the cases of Greece or Italy). Other varia-
bles such as new technologies or the generalized use of them could explain this per-
centage of votes.
Table 3 shows variations over the studied period avoiding multicollinearity (see
Table 3).
We replicated the same model to analyse whether the evolution of the populist
party vote over the 2008–2018 period could be explained by the evolution of the
same variables over time. However, no variation rate was found to be statistically sig-
nificant considering the different behavioural patterns of EU countries. Only the 10%
variation in CPI could be considered significant (sig. 0.077).
Although the value for CPI was the only significant variable in both proposed
models, we found interesting results in the average behaviour of three sets of coun-
tries based on the variation in the populist party vote. Three types of countries were
considered. Firstly, those countries where the populist parties’ vote share was
Table 2. Statistical results (source: the author). Vot. 2017.
Model Coef. Std. T Sig. (90%) Conf. Interval
1 (Constant) 45.369 19.268 2.355 0.027
CPI 2017 0.29 0.278 0.232 1.046 0.306
Des 2017 0.654 0.876 0.147 0.748 0.462
Imm 2017 0.564 0.451 0.264 1.249 0.224
2 (Constant) 54.246 15.04 3.607 0.001
CPI 2017 0.371 0.253 0.296 1.465 0.155
Imm 2017 0.477 0.432 0.223 1.103 0.28
3 (Constant) 57.12 14.874 3.84 0.001
CPI 2017 0.502 0.225 0.401 2.23 0.035 ()
Model 3. Prob> F¼ 0,1111: R-squared ¼ 0,161 Root MSE ¼ 16,495. () Significant value 5%.
Source: own work.
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minimized; secondly, those countries where that share increased by less than 100%
with respect to the starting-point of the studied period; and finally, those countries
where that share increased by more than 100% during the same decade.
Table 4 shows the average value for each variable in line with the previous classifi-
cation. It will be seen, for instance, that the average of the studied countries improved
their position in the corruption ranking by 3% during the period 2008–2018.
However, those countries where the populist parties’ share of the vote increased
showed an increase of 1.11 percent in CPI. As for those countries whose CPI fell,
their position in the corruption ranking improved above the average.
a. Countries where the vote share fell during the period 2008-2018: Austria,
Belgium, Latvia, Netherlands and United Kingdom. These countries, in addition
to being in the highest part of the CPI, improved their position above the average
over the period. Likewise, they had the highest average HDI value. As for
unemployment rates, these were the regions with the lowest percentage of
unemployed, despite being the regions with least variation in unemployment dur-
ing the period. As for immigration rates, these regions had the sharpest average
decrease in the number of immigrants.
b. Countries where the vote share doubled during the 2008–2018 period: Croatia,
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. These regions’ behaviour was very similar to that of
the countries where the vote share had fallen. To be more precise, they occupied
the lowest positions within the CPI, had the highest percentages for unemploy-
ment and the lowest average percentage for immigration.
Table 3. Bilateral correlation between variable variation rates.
Correlations Var CPI Var HDI Var vot Var Des Var Imm
Variation CPI 2013-17 Corr. Pearson 1 0.067 0.355 0.031 0.065
Sig. 0.729 0.059 0.872 0.737
Variation HDI 2013-17 Corr. Pearson 1 0.053 0.28 0.066
Sig. 0.783 0.141 0.732
Variation vot 2008-2017 Corr. Pearson 1 0.077 0.026
Sig. 0.693 0.895
Variation Des 2013-2017 Corr. Pearson 1 0.09
Sig. 0.641
Source: own work.









vote share Average countries
Var. CPI 1.11 3.86 4.96 3.07
CPI 2017 64.00 61.39 74.40 64.65
Var. HDI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
HDI 2017 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.88
Var. Des 4.30 4.13 2.36 3.88
Des. 2017 6.08 8.49 5.72 7.71
Var. Imm 0.22 0.81 0.99 0.47
Imm 2017 13.00 9.91 13.71 11.69
Source: own work.
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c. Countries where the vote share increased during the period 2008-2018, but not
to the point of doubling its value: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. These countries occupied
intermediate positions in the set of variables analysed.
5. Conclusions and limitations
Our results show that there is a high correlation between the Human Development
Index and the level of corruption. This was due to the impact of the crisis on EU citi-
zens. It eroded their optimism and undermined their hopes, and consequently various
social conflicts arose as citizens lost confidence in their democracies due to variables
like unemployment, immigration and political corruption.
We found similarities in behaviour among the EU-28 and were able to differentiate
four categories of countries in terms of selected variables which explain the social
conflict that arose during one of European history’s gravest economic crises. The
model we propose is a first approach to understanding populism in Europe and it
has some limitations owing to the similarity of behaviour in the countries analysed.
For that reason, future research should be directed to exploring heterogeneous coun-
tries around the world where the action and reaction between countries cannot be
explained by the domino effect, as it can in Europe.
Our study’s findings provide new insights which help to identify weaknesses in
democracies propitious to the growth of populist parties.
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